Does the wage gap between private and public sectors encourage political corruption? by Podobnik, Boris et al.
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Physics BU Open Access Articles
2015-10-23
Does the wage gap between
private and public sectors
encourage political corruption?
This work was made openly accessible by BU Faculty. Please share how this access benefits you.
Your story matters.
Version Published version
Citation (published version): Boris Podobnik, Vuk Vukovic, H Eugene Stanley. 2015. "Does the
Wage Gap between Private and Public Sectors Encourage Political
Corruption?." PLOS ONE, Volume 10, Issue 10, 15 pp. 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0141211
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/39941
Boston University
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Does the Wage Gap between Private and
Public Sectors Encourage Political Corruption?
Boris Podobnik1,2,3,4,5,6*, Vuk Vukovic4,5,7, H. Eugene Stanley1
1Center for Polymer Studies and Department of Physics, Boston University, Boston, MA 02215, United
States of America, 2 Faculty of Civil Engineering, University of Rijeka, 51000 Rijeka, Croatia, 3 Faculty of
Economics, University of Ljubljana, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia, 4 Zagreb School of Economics and
Management, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia, 5 Adriatic Economic Association, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia,
6 Luxembourg School of Business, Luxembourg, 7 Adam Smith Institute, 23 Great Smith Street, London,
United Kingdom
* bp@phy.hr
Abstract
We present a dynamic network model of corrupt and noncorrupt employees representing
two states in the public and private sector. Corrupt employees are more connected to one
another and are less willing to change their attitudes regarding corruption than noncorrupt
employees. This behavior enables them to prevail and become the majority in the workforce
through a first-order phase transition even though they initially represented a minority. In the
model, democracy—understood as the principle of majority rule—does not create corrup-
tion, but it serves as a mechanism that preserves corruption in the long run. The motivation
for our network model is a paradox that exists on the labor market. Although economic the-
ory indicates that higher risk investments should lead to larger rewards, in many developed
and developing countries workers in lower-risk public sector jobs are paid more than work-
ers in higher-risk private sector jobs. To determine the long-run sustainability of this eco-
nomic paradox, we study data from 28 EU countries and find that the public sector wage
premium increases with the level of corruption.
Introduction
Political corruption is arguably one of the main factors constraining wealth creation and eco-
nomic growth in modern democracies [1–11]. It can be defined as systemic misuse of primary
government institutions—laws and regulations are altered to offer private benefits to politi-
cians and government officials [5, 7]. Because an increase in corruption and state interference
increases the motivation to seek political patronage and clientelism, a highly corrupt system
changes incentives of market participants. They get skewed towards gaining political favors
instead of competing in the marketplace. In countries more prone to corruption this implies an
enormous level of inefficiency. Highly corrupt countries tend to be poorer and are usually
developing or transitional economies, often of a socialist origin [11]. They also tend to be less
open, have a higher regulation of market entry, lower freedom of the press, and steadily deplet-
ing human capital [1, 8–11].
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To quantify incentives for engaging in corruption that causes such distorted market out-
comes, we evaluate the relative riskiness of working in the public vs. private sector. Although
we would assume that the level of risk corresponds to job safety and that there should be a
higher wage premium for a riskier position, the data gathered on a sample of 28 EU countries
indicates that the lower-risk public sector job tends to hold a higher wage premium, i.e. the
remuneration for a public sector job, which is safer and offers greater benefits, is higher than
for a corresponding private sector job. Even in the United States, according to the Congressio-
nal Budget Office [12], jobs in the public sector carry greater advantages than jobs in the pri-
vate sector. They are more secure, less stressful, offer a wider selection of health-insurance
plans, better retirement benefits, flexible work arrangements, and more holiday and vacation
days per year. The question is: how is this discrepancy, in which the less riskier sector is
rewarded with higher wages, sustainable in the long run?
Our hypothesis is that in countries with high public sector wage premiums the probability
that political corruption will be present is higher. Intuitively, the greater the gap the higher
the probability that public sector jobs are being allocated not based on merit but on political
connections, nepotism, and bribery [13]. Because politicians in corrupt countries shun
accountability towards their voters, they can increase the levels of patronage and nepotism.
Thus the greater the public sector wage premium, the greater the motivation for those with-
out adequate skills and education to enter the public sector and achieve private benefits. The
wage discrepancy is in obvious contrast to economic theory that higher risk must be followed
by greater reward. To quantify how well a given wage compensates a worker for the risk
incurred, we propose a new labor reward-to-risk ratio.
Finally, using the same logic that explains why the wage premium tends to be high in more
corrupt countries, we model how the better connected corrupt minority makes corruption
grow and persist in democracies. We present a dynamic network model of corrupt and noncor-
rupt agents representing two states in public and private sectors in a corrupt environment. Cor-
rupt agents are more connected to one another and are less willing to change their attitudes
regarding corruption than noncorrupt agents. This behavior enables them to prevail and
become the majority in the workforce through a first-order phase transition. In our simple
model democracy thus serves as a mechanism of preserving corruption in more corrupt coun-
tries, the same way it prevents corruption in low-corrupt countries.
Data
Using data from a European Commission report [14] and the International Labor Organiza-
tion (ILO) [15] we analyze employee wage levels in the public and private sectors in 28 EU
countries. Using the ILO LABORSTA database, we examine wages across similar occupations
in both the public and private sector in 75 countries worldwide. Public sector wages (those
associated with public administration, schools, and medical facilities) are calculated based on a
10-year average, from 1999 to 2008. Private sector wages (i.e., all other listed occupations
excluding agriculture) are also calculated based on the same 10-year average. Although some
jobs in one sector do not have an exact counterpart in the other, we find that the jobs in the
two sectors are sufficiently similar that we can make useful comparisons. We compare similar
job positions across both sectors (e.g., cleaning personnel, bus drivers, electricians, engineers,
managers, IT personnel, administration officers, and secretaries). Obviously the gap in wages
varies with different levels of education, however in the final calculation we take the averages
across all occupations to calculate the gap. The data from the ILO database gives us the same
prediction as the data from the EU wage gap report [14].
Wage Gap and Corruption
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To measure corruption we use the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) supplied by Trans-
parency International [16] from 1999 to 2013. The CPI is a composite index based on indepen-
dent surveys of individuals and businesses provided by more than ten independent world-wide
institutions. The index measures public perceptions of abuse by officials, extent of media con-
trol, level of accountability, persistence of bribes, and level of judiciary independence. The CPI
values range from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (highly transparent). Thus the larger a country’s
CPI, the less corrupt the country. We also gather data on GDP growth and GDP per capita in
2011 PPP terms from the World Bank database from 1999 to 2013 [17].
Results
Evolution of the wage gap
Previous studies [11] suggest that the negative connection between corruption level and coun-
try wealth takes the form of a power-law functional dependence [18]. Our hypothesis here is
that across different stages of development when the wage gap between the two sectors is
skewed in favor of the public sector, the motivation to engage in corruption is increased. We
observe this relationship (Fig 1) using the set of 75 countries (ranging from undeveloped to
developed) and find an inverted U-shaped functional dependence between the public sector
wage premium and the CPI-quantified corruption level (the t-statistic of CPI2 is −6.58) with
clear clustering exhibited among the three major income groups: low-income, middle-income,
and high-income countries.
Fig 1 shows that in most low-income countries (blue circles) public sector workers are rela-
tively underpaid compared to their private sector counterparts, as the state fails to perform its
basic functions, not being able to afford higher public wages thus making public institutions
Fig 1. Evolution of the wage gap with the level of development. In this and all other figures, the
regression line t-values for the corresponding coefficients are shown in parentheses, and standard errors are
robust to heteroskedasticity. The income separators are $15,000 and $35,000 of PPP adjusted GDP per
capita.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0141211.g001
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weak. This suggests that these underpaid public sector workers will be more motivated to com-
pensate for their low wages through corruption and taking bribes. The standard literature on
corruption and wages [19] supports this argument. In this set of countries public sector corrup-
tion tends to be individualized, not systemic. Fig 1 also shows that in most medium-income
countries (dark red diamonds) corruption can grow if there is a steadily increasing wage imbal-
ance that over-inflates public-sector wages and disrupts incentives for work. Finally, Fig 1
shows that in most high-income countries (green triangles) the wage gap is greatly reduced
and corruption is low.
Wage gap, corruption and GDP growth for EU countries
Because it is often difficult to analyze a heterogeneous group of countries ranging from low-
income to high-income, as in Fig 1, we analyze a more homogeneous group of 28 EU countries
that excludes the low-income countries shown in the left section of the parabola in Fig 1. Fig 2
shows the wage gap between the 10-year average wage in the public sector and the 10-year
average wage in the private sector and compares it with the 2013 corruption level. We focus on
the sample of institutionally stable EU countries because some of the public sector jobs in the
EU (e.g., health, education, and science) tend to be held by individuals that are better educated
than their counterparts in non-EU countries—particularly those in the developing world—and
thus any comparison could be biased. Recalling that a larger CPI implies lower corruption, Fig
2 indicates that the more corrupt a country is, the greater will be the wage gap between its pub-
lic and private sectors. We fit a functional dependence in Fig 2 with a power law with α =
−0.005, a t-statistic of −2.28, and an adjusted R2 of 0.11.
Finally, to show how a public sector wage premium affects a country’s wealth, Fig 3 presents
a clear negative correlation between the average five-year GDP growth rate and the wage pre-
mium for a set of 28 EU countries (α = −5.2, t-statistic = −3.84, R2 = 0.26). The given correla-
tions say nothing about the causal relationship between corruption and the wage gap. They
Fig 2. EU countries: The higher the corruption (lower CPI) the higher the public sector wage premium.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0141211.g002
Wage Gap and Corruption
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serve as a mere motivation for our network model in which we aim to uncover why would a
country with a higher public sector wage premium have higher levels of corruption.
Wage Gap as a Motivation for Corruption
Income to Risk as Reward-to-Risk Ratio in Labor Economics
In finance it is widely accepted that bonds are less risky than stocks and thus, on average,
bonds should bring smaller returns than stocks. Similarly, if public sector jobs are less risky
than private sector jobs, wages in the public sector should be smaller than wages in the private
sector. This is frequently not the case. We speculate that this is because the corrupt minority
within the public sector uses its powerful influence to preserve the system from which they are
benefiting.
In corrupt countries in which the reward for membership in the dominant political party is
a higher-wage public sector job, public sector jobs tend to become packed with under-qualified
individuals who are prized for their obedience rather than for their ability to carry out the work
[13]. In this scenario, gaining political favors (public sector jobs) as a party member is easier
than competing in the marketplace. This disturbs incentives for work in both sectors and cre-
ates a strong motivation for those in the better paid, low-risk sector to protect their positions.
Although there are many possible definitions of risk in labor economics, we define it in
terms of the average time a worker is able to continue in his or her job. Using this definition we
immediately see that public sector jobs are more stable [20], i.e., on average they last longer
than private sector jobs. This difference in risk level becomes particularly obvious during reces-
sions and economic downturns when many more private sector jobs disappear than public sec-
tor jobs.
If we assume that holding a job in the private sector is riskier than holding one in the public
sector, the next goal is to quantify this difference. We do this by measuring the average time
Fig 3. The smaller the wage gap between public and private sectors in favor of the public sector, the
larger the average 5-year GDP growth rate.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0141211.g003
Wage Gap and Corruption
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agents in both sectors are able to work during their entire business career. We assume that the
average business time in the private sector, tpr, is smaller than the average business time in the
public sector, tpu. We define the risk in a given sector as the reciprocal average business time.
Thus the risk of a public sector is 1=tpu, and the risk of a private sector is 1=tpr. If every job is
equally available to every agent—usually not the case in a corrupt country—we start with the
assumption that two agents (two engineers or two bus drivers) with equal skills and education
in both sectors should make the same income during their entire business career. Thus we
assume the average annual income (S) to be
Spr tpr ¼ Spu tpu: ð1Þ
Here the total income made by each agent should be the same for both sectors. The parame-
ter Sτ can be further expressed as the ratio
S
s
 S
1=t
; ð2Þ
which characterizes how much income (i.e., the reward) compensates employees for risk (σ) in
a given sector. Eq (1) gives the relative compensation between the two sectors.
As stated above, the ratio shown in Eq (2) utilizes the reward-to-risk ratio defined in
finance, where agents compare investment opportunities by examining both the possible
returns and the risk levels involved in each investment [21]. The labor economics reward-to-
risk ratio shown in Eq (2) refers to the relationship between the potential reward from a given
sector and the risk present in the same sector. As stated above, a public sector job generally
offers more privileges and benefits than a private sector job (e.g., greater health care coverage).
For that reason the risk in the private sector job is somewhat greater than that expressed in Eq
(2). Taking into account the additional privileges granted in public sector jobs ϕ (and the
expenses incurred in private sector jobs), we assume that workers in the private sector should
on average make more money during their entire business careers than workers in the public
sector. Thus we assume the average annual income (S) to be Spu tpu ¼  Spr tp, where ϕ< 1.
This new parameter ϕ increases the average annual income of the private sector and addition-
ally increases the risk of the private sector
spr 
1
 tpr
¼ 1
tpr
þ s0pr: ð3Þ
We assume that the riskier sector needs to offer a larger income to employees to compensate
for the risks involved (e.g. job loss or the negative health effects of high stress environments).
This, however, is not the case in many countries.
Estimation of the Sigma parameter
We empirically estimate Eq (1) using data for Croatia [22], an EU member with a relatively
high wage premium (22%) and relatively high corruption (CPI = 47) (see Fig 2). Taking into
account several factors—the average tenure in both sectors, the relative risk of job loss, the
intention of workers to change jobs, the percentage of workers in temporary positions, the
average working hours, and the wage inequality (the percentage of workers with a wage below
60% of the medium wage)—we find that a job in the private sector is on average 2.5 to 3 times
riskier than a job in the public sector. Thus σpr in Croatia has a value that is 2.5 to 3 times
higher than σpu. Nevertheless, the average wage for a lower-risk public job is 22% higher than
the average wage for a higher-risk private job. Therefore, contrary to economic logic wages in
Wage Gap and Corruption
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the public sector, although less risky and providing greater benefits, are higher than wages in
the private sector.
Model
In the literature on corruption one of the central assumptions is that corruption is a function of
motivation and opportunity [23] where, e.g., the rich are motivated to engage in corrupt activi-
ties as inequality in society increases. We expand this conflict between the rich and the poor to
the public and private sectors. Here we assume that through corrupt activities public sector will
attempt to maintain such privileges as larger salaries and lower sector risk.
The literature on models of corruption proposes that either corruption creates income
inequalities [24] or the reverse [25]. According to Olson’s theory [26] corruption in the form of
repression comes first and provides the underlying cause, or at least the motivation, for
inequality. At the dawn of civilization, people living in small tribal communities were subject
to the constant threat of roving bandits. In order to seek protection from the roving bandits the
primitive forms of tribal societies established a stationary bandit to whom they paid taxes in
exchange for protection from roving bandits. This was the initial motivation for the creation of
the state—to have a stationary bandit to whom people pay taxes in exchange for protection
from theft and expropriation. Thus a condition of “certain repression” replaced that of uncer-
tain repression, and a class-based society was created out of which all future social orders have
developed.
We do not try to determine historically and institutionally which came first, corruption or
the gap (inequality) in incomes. We simply assume that a country has both a given wage gap
and level of corruption (see Fig 1). We do however apply the same analogy and observe how
countries characterized by different levels of income inequality can switch from a corrupt to a
non-corrupt state.
Note that wage gaps and corruption could emerge together. If a less risky public sector job is
paid more than a riskier private sector job, if the country is democratic and there is no corrup-
tion the system will not last. Note that Fig 1 reveals that for given wage gap every more corrupt
country has as a counterpart in a less corrupt country. Is there a mechanism that causes a coun-
try to switch from a predominantly corrupt to a predominantly noncorrupt? How can a politi-
cal and economic system that clearly defies economic logic be sustainable in the long run? To
answer these questions, we next propose a non-linear network model that explains how a coun-
try that starts out more corrupt can stochastically switch to being less corrupt.
Model For Two Phases
Using the results shown in Fig 2, we next determine the probability that a corrupt EU country,
e.g., Greece, will substantially reduce its corruption to a lower level, e.g., that of Sweden. We
hypothesize that, for a voting population, the two phases I and II correspond to two different
levels of corruption for the same wage premium—in I the majority of citizens are prone to cor-
ruption and in II only a minority are prone to corruption. Fig 4 shows that phases I and II are
two states in the nonlinear double-well potential between public and private sectors illustrated
in Fig 1, where the potential barrier between these two states makes the transfer difficult. For
example, when we put a system in the more corrupt state I, it slides to the bottom of the well
and, if there are no fluctuations, it stays there. If there were no fluctuations of corruption in
Greece, it would not have been able to move out of phase I. If the corruption is able to fluctuate,
however, the system can jump over the potential barrier and move to phase II, and the larger
the fluctuations, the larger the probability that the transfer can occur.
Wage Gap and Corruption
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Model with a fixed wage gap and democracy not included
The labor market in any country is composed of public and private sectors, each occupied by
both corrupt and noncorrupt agents. In our model corruption is sustained not only by those
who actively participate in corrupt activities, such as giving or taking bribes, but also by those
members of the private sector who do business with the corrupt part of the public sector. The
state of corruption is characterized by the fraction of society affected by corruption, and the
larger the fraction, the greater the corruption. By the same rationale, the larger the wage gap,
the more willing are the public sector employees to protect their rights and privileges. In the
network model the labor force is characterized by its inherent corruption level. Hereafter we
assume that the fraction q (1 − q) of all agents are inherently corrupt (noncorrupt) where, with-
out loss of generality, half of the inherently corrupt agents are in the public sector, and their
behavior is the same irrespective of the sector to which they belong. However each inherently
noncorrupt (corrupt) agent can become corrupt (noncorrupt) if they are surrounded by a criti-
cally large fraction of corrupt (noncorrupt) agents [27].
We define inherently corrupt agents as forming an Erdős-Renyi network ER I in which
intra-network links are randomly chosen and their average number is kc. Similarly, inherently
noncorrupt agents form another Erdős-Renyi network ER II in which the average number of
intra-links is ku< kc (see Fig 5). We demonstrate below that the condition kc> ku is why inher-
ently corrupt agents can dominate inherently noncorrupt agents, even when the latter group
Fig 4. Illustrations of effective potentials. For a given wage premium two phases are shown corresponding to low and high corruption levels.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0141211.g004
Wage Gap and Corruption
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outnumbers the former. Once both networks are created, we randomly link agents from ER I
with agents from ER II, where the average number of inter-network links is ku, c. Inter-network
links serve to switch the attitude of the agents in the competing group.
In the network model corrupt agents in the public sector tend to be more interconnected
than noncorrupt agents in order to keep the asymmetry in rights and incomes between the
public and private sector in favor of the public sector. Here corrupt agents in the private sector
do not benefit directly from the wage gap, but because they are connected to corrupt public sec-
tor agents, they can benefit from exclusive public procurement contracts or prone legislation.
As stated above, we allow each agent to switch their stance toward corruption in two ways,
internally or externally [28]. Internally a corrupt agent from network ER I can, with a probabil-
ity p1,c, become noncorrupt for a finite period of time τ (e.g., the time period between two elec-
tions). Similarly, an noncorrupt agent from network ER II can, with a probability p1,u, become
corrupt during a period τ—in practice the media may affect these internal transitions. Exter-
nally, based on a threshold concept [27], each agent can also be influenced by their neighbors
to change their opinion. If the total fraction of corrupt neighbors of a corrupt agent i is less
than a fractional threshold Tc [29], with the probability p2,c the corrupt agent i will become
externally noncorrupt. Similarly, if the total fraction of noncorrupt neighbors of an noncorrupt
agent i is less than a fractional threshold Tc [29], then the probability that an noncorrupt agent
i will become externally corrupt is p2,u. Thus if the majority of local contacts are corrupt,
remaining noncorrupt is a disadvantage. When a country is highly corrupt it is generally more
likely that noncorrupt agents will become corrupt than vice versa, so Tu > Tc. For reasons of
simplicity, we hereafter set Tu = 1 − Tc, where Tc is determined by the level of corruption. In
numerical simulations for simplicity we set p1,c = p1,u p1 and p2,u = p2,c p2 even though the
more appropriate would be p1,c< p1,u, i.e., the noncorrupt agents more readily become corrupt
than the reverse.
We next analyze network ER II. In order to ensure a voter majority, the inherently corrupt
agents in ER I must successfully influence a fraction of noncorrupt agents in ER II to become
corrupt. Fig 6A shows for network ER II the phase diagram in model parameters (p1, p2),
where the hysteresis exhibits a first-order phase transition [28]. The hysteresis region is
bounded by two spinodals merging at a critical point [28]. The right spinodal is obtained by
increasing p2 starting from agents that are each externally and internally functional in both net-
works. The left spinodal is obtained by decreasing p2, starting from agents that are each inter-
nally functional but externally dysfunctional in both networks. When the model parameters
are set at the critical point [see Fig 6A], Fig 6B shows how the fraction of noncorrupt agents in
network ER II flips back and forth between two phases. When the fraction flips to a lower state
Fig 5. Two regular networkmodels where corrupt agents (red) are more intra-linked than uncorrupt agents (blue). Here kc = 4, ku = 2, and kcu = 2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0141211.g005
Wage Gap and Corruption
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the majority of agents in ER II become corrupt. Phase-flipping [28] is characteristic of a ran-
dom walker put in an effective double-well potential such as the one in Fig 6. By phase-flipping
behavior we mean a special property of dynamic networks, when for some choice of network
parameters the network may spontaneously jump from one state to another and this process
may hold repeatedly. Recently phase flipping has been modeled in finance [28] and economics
[29]. In economics we may say that years of recession and years of expansion represent these
phase-flipping states. In section Model For Two Phases we argue that in our model phase flip-
ping occurs when corruption (here modeled by parameters p1 and p2) is allowed to fluctuate,
which makes the system repeatedly jump over the potential barrier. However, the magnitude of
fluctuations depends on the size of the system, and since the number of agents in public and
private sectors is generally large, it is not likely that this phase-flipping phenomenon will occur
among countries with different corruption levels.
In the network model the parameters Tc, kc, ku, and kuc control the level of corruption of a
given country. Fig 7A shows, for a given set of parameters, how the majority of all agents in ER
I and ER II suddenly become corrupt as the Tc value approaches 0.5, despite the initially larger
fraction of inherently noncorrupt agents. Fig 7B shows that when the number of intra-links
between corrupt agents is increased and the number of intra-links between noncorrupt agents
Fig 6. (A) As a result of competing between two networks we show the phase space of network II. We used τ = 50, Th = 0.5. (B) Close to a critical point,
p1 = 0.004, p2 = 0.51, where τ = 50, Th = 0.5 we show the phase flipping between two phases. We use q = 0.25.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0141211.g006
Wage Gap and Corruption
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is fixed the majority of agents abruptly become corrupt. This demonstrates how a minority of
inherently corrupt agents can achieve an electoral majority—they make certain that the num-
ber of their intra-linked connections exceeds those of the noncorrupt agents. Note that the net-
work formalism enables a discontinuous and sudden jump from one state to another, similar
to switching processes between different regimes in stochastic processes (e.g. Markov Regime
Switching Models) [30].
Mean-field theory based on random graphs
Using mean-field theory based on random regular topology, we next analytically describe the
interaction between corrupt and uncorrupt agents. In both networks, d 1 − f is the fraction
of “disfunctional” agents, where f is the fraction of “functional” agents, differently defined in
ER I and ER II. In network ER I corrupt agents are functional and the uncorrupt disfunctional.
In network ER II the reverse is true. Assuming that internal and external failures are
Fig 7. Fraction of corrupt agents increases with the number of intra-links and the threshold. (A) With increasing the vulnerability of noncorrupt agents
in a corrupt surrounding, here quantified by threshold Tu, the corrupt fraction increases. We use p1 = 0.002, p2 = 0.7, ku = 2, kc = 5, kuc = 2. We use 2000
agents with 25% of corrupt agents. (B) With increasing the number of contacts established by corrupt agents, the corrupt fraction abruptly increases at one kc
value. We use Tc = 0.5, ku = 2, and kuc = 2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0141211.g007
Wage Gap and Corruption
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independent, we approximate the values of d in each network by
dc  1 fc ¼ p þ p2ð1 pÞEc
du  1 fu ¼ p þ p2ð1 pÞEu;
ð4Þ
where p = exp(−τp1) is the average fraction of internally disfunctional agents [28] and p2 ES
the probability that a corrupt agent in network I with a critically damaged neighberhood quan-
tified by Ec has externally become uncorrupt, where
Ec ¼ Stcj¼0Sji¼0
kc
kc  i
 !
dkcic f
i
c
ku;c
ku;c  ðj iÞ
0
@
1
Af ku;cðjiÞu djiu
Eu ¼ Stuj¼0Sji¼0
ku
ku  i
 !
dkuiu f
i
u
kc;u
kc;u  ðj iÞ
0
@
1
Af kc;uðjiÞc djic :
ð5Þ
Here tc represents the absolute threshold of network ER I—a corrupt agent in ER I can
externally fail and become uncorrupt with a probability pc,2 only when the number of uncor-
rupt neighbors in both network ER I and network ER II is lower than or equal to tc. We obtain
Eu for network ER II from Ec when u, c.
Recalling that q denotes the fraction of inherently corrupt agents, we find that the fraction
of corrupt agents is
F tot ¼ qð1 dcÞ þ ð1 qÞdu: ð6Þ
Here du and dc are defined as in Eq (4). For a given p1 and p2, we can find sets of parameters
(kc, ku, ku, c) for which the fraction of corrupt agents becomes a majority, F tot > 0:5, F tot > 0:5
can be achieved by keeping dc as small as possible and du as large as possible [see Fig 4B]. Note
that from Eqs (4)–(6), as tc becomes smaller, the Ec does as well, and this implies a smaller dc.
Similarly, the larger the tu value, the larger the Eu value, and this implies a larger du.
Note that, due to finite-size effects and stochasticity, in relatively small samples the local-
time sample realizations in p1(t) and p2(t) can substantially fluctuate from the population val-
ues [28] p1 and p2. This causes a spontaneous and dramatic switch between ER I and ER II. In a
very large sample, e.g., the entire population of a country, this corrupt-to-uncorrupt switch is
not as probable [29].
Model with variable wage gap where democracy is a mechanism of
corruption preservation
The current literature reports that the relationship between democracy and corruption is
inconclusive [31, 32]. We now add democracy to the network model for developing and devel-
oped countries described in Sec. 5, and exclude the leftmost part of the concave dependence
shown in Fig 1.
We assume that when the members of a country’s parliament are randomly chosen from
the country’s citizens, the random nature of the electoral system can result in a parliamentary
membership that is more corrupt than the average corruption level of society. We also assume
that the difference between the corruption level of the parliament and the average corruption
level of society, D, proportionally changes the parameters controlling the corruption level (e.g.,
kc and Tc) and increases both the corruption level and the wage gap. In general, the larger the
fluctuations in D, the larger the probability that a switch from a predominantly corrupt (I) to a
predominantly noncorrupt (II) phase will occur. On the other hand, when parliament
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members are less corrupt than the average corruption level of the society, the parameters
change, i.e., the threshold Tu is decreased, the country is less corrupt, and the wage gap is
reduced. Thus if the majority of citizens of a democratic country are prone to corruption, it is
probable that the country’s parliamentary membership—which is a randomly chosen sample
—will reflect that same level of corruption. Thus, according to our model, democracy is not
responsible for the emergence of corruption, but can be responsible for its persistence. This
theoretical result is in agreement with empirical studies that indicate that lowering corruption
in a democracy requires a period of time in excess of forty years [9].
We see an inherent flaw of democracy in such corrupt systems. According to the logic of the
selectorate theory [33], in democracies characterized by a set of extractive economic and politi-
cal institutions [34] the political elites design a system that supports their rent-extracting activi-
ties. They are able to stay in power by maintaining a winning coalition of supporters, and they
do this by building and maintaining a legitimate electoral majority. Because the political struc-
ture is democratic, they do this by supplying their supporters with public goods.
Thus, in our model, democracy acts as a stabilization mechanism for the system, irrespective
of corruption level. In corrupt democratic societies the corrupt electoral majority is highly
intra-linked, the legislative body faithfully represents them, and the corruption level is sus-
tained. In societies with a low level of corruption the mechanism is the same: the electoral
majority is not corrupt, the societal network is homogeneously interconnected, and the demo-
cratic mechanisms isolate the corrupt minority and minimize its influence on the government
and its institutions.
It follows that in a system in which the majority of participating voters are corrupt, we will
find a Nash equilibrium in which democracy sustains corruption. The opposite is true for soci-
eties in which the majority of voters are noncorrupt. Thus in a corrupt society we will find
parameter sets kc, ku, ku, c (see Eq (5)) for which the majority of agents who vote will engage in
corrupt practices (F tot > 0:5). At higher levels of corruption we assume these agents gain an
increasing amount of influence. When this group of interconnected corrupt voters achieve an
electoral majority (Fig 5) their optimal response strategy is to choose politicians who will allow
them to continue their corrupt practices. For a Nash equilibrium to hold, none of the agents
can have an incentive to deviate. If they were to deviate and vote for congruent (non-corrupt)
politicians, their ability to influence the government would be reduced. This Nash equilibrium
is self-reinforcing as long as the corrupt outnumber the uncorrupt. Democracy thus does not
create corruption, but it can be used as a tool for sustaining it when the electoral majority is
corrupt.
Here we disregarded the role of political parties and how they maintain the equilibrium,
particularly when both parties are equally corrupt. If agents choose their parties randomly,
then the distribution of members in a party will reflect the distribution of the electorate. This
means that the statistics for large samples will be very similar to the statistics for the entire pop-
ulation. In other words, in a corrupt society all political parties will have more corrupt agents
than noncorrupt.
Because all parties compete for the same electorate, a change in the ruling political party will
not necessarily change the country’s level of corruption. Thus a flip from a corrupt to a non-
corrupt state can only occur when random selection happens to place a non-corrupt person in
the position of head of state.
For example, in Croatia both two main political parties (and some of their coalition part-
ners) became engulfed in corruption scandals, having their high-ranking party officials ending
up in prison on corruption charges. Similar scenarios can be observed in many other countries
that suffer from the same structural wage imbalance. For example in Italy, after decades of rule
by the Christian Democrats their corrupt practices were finally exposed in 1992 under the
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Tangentopoli affair. Although this nation-wide investigation effectively destroyed the Christian
Democrats, it also led to charges against the main opposition party, the Social Democrats and
its leader Bettino Craxi, who became a symbol of political corruption in Italy.
Conclusion
In financial markets stocks are riskier than bonds because they promise a higher return. Were
the opposite true and low-risk investments generated higher returns, the distorted investment
signals would collapse the market. This is not the case in labor economics, where low-risk pub-
lic sector jobs are often better paid than high-risk private sector jobs. We examine this wage
gap paradox for 28 EU member states and find that those with a larger wage gap have a higher
level of corruption than those with a lower wage gap. We define a new reward-to-risk labor
ratio to compensate for varying risks of different sectors. We propose a dynamical inter-con-
nected network model in which inherently corrupt and noncorrupt agents compete to achieve
dominance, and where democracy serves as a mechanism that preserves corruption.
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